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Abstract
The conventional wisdom is that pohticians' rent-seeking motives increase pubhc
debt and deficits. This is because myopic pohticians face pohtical risk and prefer to
extract pohtical rents as early as possible. An imphcation of this argument is that
governments will under-save during a boom, leaving the economy unprotected in the
event of a downturn. This view motivates a number of fiscal rules which are aimed
at cutting deficits and constraining borrowing so as to limit the size of this political
distortion. In this paper we study the determination of government debt and deficits
in a dynamic model of debt which characterizes political distortions. We find that in
our model the conventional wisdom always applies in the long run, but only does so
in the short run when economic volatility is low. Instead, when economic volatility
is high, a rent-seeking government over-saves and over-taxes along the equilibrium
path relative to a benevolent government. Paradoxically, the over-saving bias can
also be solved in this case by a rule of capping deficits, although the mechanism
operates through its eff'ect on expectations of future rent extraction rather than
though the contemporary constraint. However, these rules are ineffective in solving
the high taxation problem caused by the political friction, which in the short run is
more acute in the high income volatility scenario.
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1 Introduction
The conventional wisdom is that the rent-seeking motives of pohticians increase pubHc
debt and deficits. This is because myopic pohticians face political risk and prefer to extract
rents as early as possible. An implication of this argument is that governments will under-
save during a boom, leaving the economy unprotected in the event of a downturn.^ This
view is not only of theoretical interest, but it motivates a number of fiscal rules in the
world which are aimed at cutting deficits and constraining borrowing so as to limit the
size of this political distortion."
In this paper we study the determination of government debt and deficits in a dynamic
model that characterizes political distortions.'^ In a nutshell, we find that the conventional
wisdom always applies in the long run, but only does so in the short run when economic
volatility is low. In contrast, the conventional wisdom does not hold in the short run
when economic volatility is high since politicians choose public debt and deficits which
are too low. Paradoxically, the over-saving bias can also be solved in this case by a rule of
capping deficits, although the mechanism operates through its effect on expectations of
future rent extraction rather than through the contemporary constraint. However, these
rules are ineff'ective in solving the high taxation problem caused by the political friction,
which in the short run is moi'e accute in the high income volatility scenario.
More specifically, we study an economy managed by a sequence of politicians who
face political risk and who care about household welfare and rents. In contrast to the
previous work on the political economy of debt, we consider the interrelated implications
of three important features: economic uncertainty, incomplete markets, and transitional
dynamics. The economy begins in a boom, and this boom can come to a permanent end
at any date. Throughout the length of the boom, the benevolent government gradually
reduces its debt in order to prepare for the potential downturn. We compare this optimal
behavior to that of a rent-seeking government managed by politicians.
Our first result is that while a rent-seeking government reduces its debt at the be-
ginning of the boom, it stops reducing its debt if the boom is sufficiently prolonged.
'See Battaglini and Coate (2008) and the survey article of Alesina and Perotti (1994) for a discussion
of this view.
^ Chile provides a recent example which has become a reference for fiscal reforms in Latin America and
commodity producing economies more broadly. The fiscal rule establishes a structural (i.e., at "normal"
terms of trades) surplus of 0.5 percent of GDP. Thus, when terms of trade rise as a result of a commodity
boom, the state runs very large fiscal surpluses (the sum of the structural surplus target plus the excess
fiscal income due to high commodity prices).
* Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2007a, 2007b) also study the effect of political economy distortions
on taxes, though they do not consider the effect on government debt.
This is because beyond a certain date, government resources become so abundant that
rent-seeking considerations come to dominate intertemporal smoothing considerations. A
rent-seeking government realizes that if it were to save more, then a future replacement
government would use the additional funds for rent-seeking (which only benefits incum-
bent politicians) as opposed to tax-cutting (which benefits households), and the govern-
ment therefore restrains its savings in order to starve the future government of funds.
Therefore, in the long run, a prolonged boom always leads a benevolent government to
hold more assets and to tax less than a rent-seeking government. This result is consistent
with that emphasized by Battaglini and Coate (2008). Our main contribution is to show
that while this characterization applies to the long run fairly generally, whether or not
it applies to the transitional dynamics of the economy depends on the level of economic
volatility.
Our second result is that if economic volatility is sufficiently low relative to politi-
cal uncertainty, then the rent-seeking government over-borrows and under-taxes along
the equilibrium path relative to a benevolent government. This insight-which is consis-
tent with the conventional wisdom-emerges because low economic volatility implies that
poHticians are biased toward extracting rents today versus in the future since political
risk is high and the cost of leaving the economy exposed in the downturn is low. This
causes governments to over-borrow and under-taxes at later stages of the boom when debt
is driven down sufficiently and the prospect for rent-seeking approaches. Politicians at
early stages of the boom anticipate this behavior of politicians in the future, and for this
reason, they choose to over-borrow and to under-tax themselves. Thus the prospect of
future rent-seeking reinforces over-borrowing and under-taxation in the present.
Our third and most important result-which stands in contrast to the conventional
wisdom-is that if economic volatility is sufficiently high relative to political uncertainty,
then the rent-seeking government over-saves and over-taxes along the equilibrium path
relative to a benevolent government. Whenever economic volatility is high, politicians
are less likely to consume rents today and more likely to consume them tomorrow since
this simultaneously protects the economy while providing them with potential rents in
the event of a boom during which they are not replaced. In anticipation of these rents
in the future, the rent-seeking government actually over-saves relative to a benevolent
government since the marginal value of additional funds in the future boom due to rent-
seeking exceeds the marginal value of additional funds for a benevolent government who
would instead use the additional savings to cut taxes. This causes governments to over-
save and over-tax at later stages of the boom when debt is driven down sufficiently and the
prospect for rent-seeking approaches. Politicians at early stages of the boom anticipate
this behavior of politicians in the future, and for this reason, they choose to over-save
and to over-tax themselves. The prospect of future rent-seeking therefore reinforces over-
saving and over-taxing in the present. >i^ ,: : .
Our last result is that the popular fiscal rule of capping deficits brings deficits and sur-
pluses closer to those of the benevolent government, although the mechanism is different
in the under-saving and over-saving cases. In the under-saving region, the government
would like to save less in order to starve the future government of resources which it
would otherwise squander on rents. However, the rule does not permit the government
to do this, so that it must necessarily bind and it forces the rent-seeking government to
save more and to behave more like a benevolent government. In the over-saving region,
the rule works through expectations by reducing the value of future public funds. More
specifically, unconstrained governments over-save because they look forward to squander-
ing public funds in the future if the boom persists for sufficiently long. The fiscal rule
however makes it impossible to squander these public funds in the future since it forces
a future government to save more. Therefore, the rule reduces the value of future funds
from today's perspective, and this induces today's government to save less. Part of this
reduction in savings comes not from deep tax cuts but from earlier and higher levels of
rent extraction relative to the economy in the absence of fiscal rules. More generally,
on its own, the fiscal rule cannot force governments to cut taxes when resources become
sufficiently abundant, and in the long run, additional increases in savings are used purely
for rent-seeking.
This paper builds on the literature on optimal fiscal policy and debt management
dating back to the classical work of Barro (1979) and Lucas and Stokey (1983).'' We depart
from this work by relaxing the assumption of a benevolent government and by assuming
that the economy is managed by politicians who derive partial utility from rents and
who face potential replacement. In this regard, this paper is most closely related to the
literature on the political economy of debt. More specifically, our work complements that
of Battaglini and Coate (2008). As in our work, they consider a setting in which current
governments face economic risk and political risk. They show that the presence of political
risk implies that in the long run, a rent-seeking government holds a level of debt which
exceeds that of the benevolent government. We depart from their work by focusing on the
implications of political economy distortions along the equilibrium path and away from
steady state. In the process, we describe a novel over-saving mechanism. Our work is also
related to that of Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2007) who show that intergenerational
'See also Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Seppala (2002), Bohn (1990), and Chari and Kehoe (1993a,
1993b).
conflict in a dynamic model can cause a government to under-save or over-save relative
to the social optimum. We depart from their work by abstracting from intergenerational
conflict and considering instead the impact of political and economic risk.^ Finally, our
over-saving result is related to the work of Yared (2008) who argues that prescribing
high levels of savings in the presence of rent-seeking politicians is distortionary since it
is associated with the anticipation of future rents. In contrast, in the current paper we
explain these high savings as an endogenous mechanism to extract future rents when
effective economic uncertainty is high.
This introduction is followed by five sections and an appendix. Section 2 describes the
environment and Section 3 describes the corresponding equilibrium under a benevolent
government. Section 4 describes the equilibrium under a rent-seeking government and
compares it to that of a benevolent government. Section 5 describes a simulation of our
economy and discusses policy implications. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains
the proofs and additional material.
2 Model ,;"'
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2.1 Economic Environment
There are discrete time periods t — {0, ...,oo} and a continuum of mass 1 of identical
households with the following period welfare:
:,, • \ Eolf^P'uic)], Pe{0,l), .. , • (1)
for Q > which represents consumption and for u {) which satisfies u' {) , —u" {) , v!" (•) >
0, v! (0) = oo, and v! (oo) = 0. Households hold a constant endowment e > 0, they pay
lump sum taxes to the government r^ < e, and they balance their budget so that q = e— r^.
Since r^ can be negative, it can also be interpreted as negative of public spending.
There is a large number of potential and identical politicians who derive the flow utility
u (q) when out of power and who derive the flow utility u (q) -f- Qxt when in power for
Xj > which represents socially wasteful rents.'' 6* > and we refer to the special case
'For additional work on the political economy of debt, see for example Aghion and Bolton (H
Alesina and Perotti (1994), Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Amador (2003), Lizzeri (1999), and Persson
and Svensson (1989).
''While the linearity of rents in the utility function is important for the full characterization of the
model, the over-saving mechanism we describe depends on the existence of a region in which rents are
zero. Specifically if v (i) represents the flow utility of rents, we require v' (0) < oo. Details available upon
of ^ = as a benevolent government since it corresponds to the case in which incumbent
poUticians have the same preferences as households. Levels of 9 which exceed captures
the inverse cost of rent-seeking for the politician so that higher levels of 9 are associated
with less costly rent-seeking. - , ,
A politician in power in period t is permanently removed from office and replaced with
an identical politician from i-|- 1 onward with exogenous probability 1 — g G (0, 1), so that
q represents the survival rate of a politician.^ Therefore, the welfare of the incumbent at
i = can be written as
/?' {u {ct) + q'9xt)
J
, (2)
where we have taken into account that a politician in period zero survives to period t with
probability g*.
In every period, the government finances rents Xt > and debt 6f ^ by raising
revenue Tt < e and borrowing 6(+] ^ from international markets at a price /? 6 (0, 1).
In addition, the government experiences an exogenous endowment shock yt-^ The govern-
ment's dynamic budget constraint is
.
(5ht+i ^bt + xt- {Tt + yt) -. (3)
for a given 6o subject to limj_oo P^bt+i < 0.
The endowment yt is stochastic and depends on the state St € {L, H} with y (H) =
—y (L) = (7 > 0. The government therefore exists to smooth household's consumption. St
follows a first order Markov process and is independent of the political replacement shock.
Let So = H. We simplify our discussion by assuming that Pr {sj = L\st-i — L} = I and
that Pr {s( = H\st_i = H} — a E {0, 1). We refer to state H as the boom and state L
as the downturn. We will focus on the path of the economy with Sq = H. Therefore, the
economy is experiencing a temporary boom which may permanently end at any date with
probability I — a^
request.
We could instead allow politicians to return to power, and none of our results would change if the
probability of holding power at any t is i.i.d.
**There is no difference between letting the government or the households experience this endowment
shock.
"This formulation allows for tractability. We have numerically simulated economies in which S( = I, is
not absorbing and achieved similar characterization to our analytical results here. Details available upon
request.
2.2 Political Environment
The order of events at every period t is as follows:
1. Nature determines yt and potentially replaces the period ( — 1 incumbent.
2. The period t politician chooses policies {Tt,xt,bt+\}.
3. Markets open and clear.
Given that there are many potential equilibria which can emerge in this setting, we
consider the symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium which coincides with the limit of our
economy with T periods as T —> oo.'" In this equilibrium, the incumbent poHtician-
independently of identity and of past political shocks-chooses policies as a function of
the state St and the level of debt bt. Note that in choosing Tt, the incumbent effectively
chooses C(, so that without loss of generahty, we will refer to c {b, s), x [b, s) and b' (6, s) as
the politician's choices of q, Xt, and fe(+i, respectively, conditional on bt — b and St — s.
Define V^ (6, s) and V'^ (6, s) as the continuation value of being out of office and in office,
respectively, with debt b in state s. The set of policies {c (6, s) , x (6, s) , b' [b, s)}^^^ ^ con-
stitutes an Markov Perfect Equilibrium if {c {b, s)
,
x (6, s)
,
b' {b, s)} maximizes V^ {b, s)
given b and s and subject to the government's dynamic budget constraint.
3 Benevolent Government Benchmark
We begin by considering the policies of the benevolent government which corresponds to
a special case of our economy with ^ = 0. In this circumstance, V^ (6, s) equals V^ {b, s),
and to facilitate future discussion, we let the superscript B denote the continuation value
and the policies of the benevolent government. The problem of the government in the
downturn can be written as
,. F^(6,L) = maxu(c)+/3y^(6',L) (4)
\ s.t.
";"
;
Pb' ^b + x-{e-a), / (5)
Since households are always better off consuming more, the solution to this problem
assigns x^ (6, L) = 0. Conditional on b', the politician is always better off taxing less versus
"That is, subject to the constraint that /? fcr+i < 0.
extracting more rents. Therefore, the problem is mathematically equivalent to a personal
consumption problem in which smoothing consumption is optimal. Thus, c^ [b, L) =
e - a - 6 (1 - /?), b'^ {b, L) = 6, and V^ {b,L) = u{e - a - b(l - P)) / (1 - /3).
Using this characterization, we can now consider the government's problem during the
preceding boom:
V'^ {b,H) = maxu{c)+PE,V^ {b',s) (6)
c,x,b'
/~'^
- s.t.
Pb' ^b + x-{e + a). (7)
As in the downturn, the solution to this problem yields x^ [b,H) = 0, and optimality
requires c^ [b, H) to be defined by the following Euler equation:
u, [c^ {b, H)) - au, [c^ [b' (6, H) , H)) + (1 - a) u, (c^ (6' (6, H) , L)) . (8)
Lemma 1 c^ [b, H) is strictly decreasing in b, b'^ (6, H) is strictly increasing in b, and
b'^ (6, H) < b.
The government taxes more and saves less when government debt is high since the
economy is relatively poor. The government always raises its savings in the boom in
preparation for the downturn and it continues to drive down its debt until the boom ends.
Note that as the boom persists, the size of the government asset position approaches
infinity since the government always benefits from saving more in preparation for the
downturn.
4 Rent-Seeking Government
We now consider the behavior of a government more generally for all ^ > 0. Here we
write the problem of the government recursively (Section 4.1), characterize the dynamics
of consumption and debt (Section 4.2), and compare these policies to those of a benevolent
government (Section 4.3).
4.1 Recursive Program
Conditional on entering a downturn, the incumbent politician solves the following prob-
lem:
7^ (6, L) = max {u (c) + Ox + P (qV'' {b' , L) + (1 - g) V'^ {b\ L)) } (9)
c,x,b'
s.t. X > and
Pb' = b + x-{e-a). (10)
The government clearly wishes to smooth consumption, though it is also interested in
rent-seeking which provides a marginal utility of 9 and sets a lower bound for the marginal
utility of consumption. This means that during the downturn, politicians choose the fol-
lowing policies, where the superscript P denotes the policies of a rent-seeking government:
c^{b,L) - min{e-a- (1 -^)6,n,-^(^)}
1-/3
I'P /L r\ ) u e -
cr
- it^M^)
(6, L) — max < o,
x^{b,L) = max
^ 0, ^^^^^4^ - 6
1-/3
The rent-seeking government follows the same smooth policies with zero rent-seeking
as those of a benevolent government as long as its initial stock of debt b is above a
threshold {e — a — uj^ {6)) / (1 — /3). In this case, the government is relatively poor and
any additional reductions in b are used for reducing taxes on households as opposed to
raising rents (since the marginal benefit of cutting those taxes exceeds 6.).
If b is below this threshold, then the government is rich. Politicians extract positive
rents, they tax households more than the benevolent government, and they borrow more
than the benevolent government. More specifically, consumption is held at u~^ {9), so that
the marginal benefit of rent-seeking equals the marginal benefit of consumption. Moreover,
debt is held at (e — cr — u~^ {9)) / {1 — P). Therefore, any additional reductions in b are
used only for rent-seeking as opposed to tax or debt reduction. By following this strategy,
the incumbent politician who may be replaced in the future chooses to frontload all rent-
extraction and leaves all future politicians with zero rents. Note that the threshold which
separates the zero rent region from the positive rent region rises with the rent-seeking
bias 9.
Given these policies, we can characterize V'^ (6, L) and V^ (6, L).
Lemma 2 The following conditions hold for j = P, N
:
•
1. V^ {b, L) is strictly decreasing in b, strictly concave in b, and continuously differen-
tiable mb forb> [e-cj - uj^ {6)) / (1 - /3),
2. V^ {b, L) is linear in b and continuously differentiable in b for b < [e — a — u~^ [6]) / (1 — P)
with I/j,^ {b, L) = -e,
3. V^ {b, L) is linear inb and continuously differentiable in bforb < (e — cr — u"-^ (6')) / {I — P)
with , ,
'.
lim V,,^ {b,L) = -9 and lim V^''{b,L)=0.
6_[(e-a-ur'W)/(l-/3)]^ 6-[(e-<r-ur' (e))/(l-/3)]
The important feature of Lemma 2 is that V'^ (6, L) is not differentiable at the cutoff
point {e — a — u~^ {6)) / {1 - P) where rent-seeking begins. This is because additional
resources are no longer used for cutting taxes and are instead used for raising rents which
does not benefit society. We will see that an analogous result to Lemma 2 holds in the
boom.
Given the behavior of the economy in the downturn, we characterize the policy of
the benevolent government in the boom. The incumbent politician solves the following
problem:
- V^{b,H)=ma.x{u{c) + 9x + PEs{{qV''{b',s) + {l-q)V''{b',s))}} (11)
_ .
. .
s.t.
Pb' = b + x + c-{e + a) (12)
To facilitate discussion, we define the following cut-off point:
6 = (e + a - max {u;' {9) , 2a + u^' {0 (1 - aq) / (1 - a))}) / (1 - /3) . (13)
We will show that b represents the steady state level of debt to which the economy
converges during a sustained boom. Note that the exact characterization of b depends
on the level of volatility a, and this is important since there are two cases two consider.
Specifically, define a* as
Note that since g < 1, ct* > 0. The cutoff value a* decreases in q, so that as pohtical
survival q goes to 1, a* goes to 0. Moreover, as the persistence of the boom a increases,
a* increases. Finally, it can be shown by implicit differentiation given that ^i"'() >
that a* is decreasing in the rent-seeking bias 9}^ Therefore, a is more likely to exceed a*
if political risk is low, the boom is temporary, and the rent-seeking bias 6 is high.
As we will show, rent-seeking begins at levels of debt below e + a — u'^^ (^) + Pk- Thus,
an analogous result to Lemma 2 holds and we can characterize V^ (6, H) and V^ (6, H).
Lemma 3 The following conditions hold for j — P, N
:
1. V^ {b,H) is strictly decreasing m b, strictly concave in b, and continuously dijjeren-
tiable m b for b > e + a — u~^ {9) + j3b,
2. V^ (6, H) is linear in b and continuously differentiable in b forb < e+ a — u~^ {0)+/3b
with V^P {b,H) = -9,
3. V^ {b,H) is linear in b and continuously differentiable inbforb < e+a — u~^ (^)+/9^
with i, . . : i, ,1 -. /.,• : '..-'' ' ... --' : ,' • , .'
'
'
^
...-• lim V^^ {b,H) = -9 and lim
_
V^^ (fe, //) = .
6-»[e+CT-u^'(6l)+/3fc]'^ 6-.[e+o--ur^(6»)+/3b]
The first order conditions and the envelope condition imply that if b'^ {b, H) > e +
cr - lij^ (e)
-h/36, then ^ > , _,.''..;"'
Ur (c^ (6, H)) - au, (c^ (r (6, H),H)) + [l-a) u, (c^ (6'^ (6, //) , L))
,
(14)
so that the Euler equation holds with equality as under a benevolent government. More-
over, if b'^ {b,H) <e + a- u"^ (9) + /36, then . _
.: u,{c^{b,H)) =aq9 + {l-a)u,{c^ {b'^{b,H),L)). ... (15)
These two equations relate the marginal cost of public funds today to the expected
marginal cost of public funds tomorrow. They show that the marginal cost of public funds
tomorrow depends on whether or not rent-seeking takes place during the boom.^^ If no
"Formally, ^ < \ ({u,^ (."i (0)))"^ - (u„ ^u^^ j^^lz^) jy'^j < o.
^Savings are never high enough for rent-seeking to occur both in the boom and in the downturn since
this is suboptimal for today's government.
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rent-seeking takes place, the marginal cost of public funds equals the marginal utihty of
consumption since additional resources are used to boost consumption (equation. (14)).
In contrast, if rent-seeking takes place, the marginal cost of public funds is qO since
today's politician maintains power with probability q and extracts rents in the future
which provide marginal benefit 9 (equation (15)).''^
4.2 Transitional Dynamics
We begin by describing the transitional dynamics of policies under a rent-seeking govern-
ment.
Proposition 1 (dynamics) Policies satisfy the following properties for some b > b:
1. b'^ (6, H) = b if b <b, b'^ {b, H) < b if b >b, and b'^ {b, H) weakly increases in b,
2. Ifa<a% thenc^{b,H) < {=)u-^ (9) and x'" {b, H) = {>)0 ifb> {<)b, and
3. If a > a*, thenc^{b,H) < {=) u-^ {9) andx^{b,H) - (>)0 if b > {<)b.
Figures 1 and 2 display this proposition graphically. Specifically, they depict b'^ {b, H)
as a function of 6 for a < a* and a > a* , respectively. Much like the benevolent govern-
ment, the rent-seeking government lets debt decline monotonically throughout the boom,
but unlike the benevolent government, government assets do not rise forever. Beyond 6, a
prolonged boom causes the government to stabilize tomorrow's debt at a minimum point
b. These figures also depict the rent-seeking regions for different levels of a. If a < a*,
then rent-seeking begins when debt goes below b. In contrast, if cr > ct*, then rent-seeking
begins when debt drops below b > b.
The implied dynamics of consumption and rents depend crucially on the degree of
economic uncertainty a. If cr < a*, then starting from 6o > b, the governments saves
and it never extracts rents along the path. Once debt 6 first reaches 6, the government
chooses b'^ (6, H) — bso that the economy reaches the steady state with zero rents. The
government never saves beyond b since politicians know that rents would be extracted
by a likely replacement government, and the additional benefit of making these savings
^^Note that if 6'-f° [h,H) = e+ a-u-^ [0) + fib, then 1/^ (b,H) is not differentiate, though Uc (c^ {b,H))
must be in the range between the right hand side of (15) and the right hand side of (14). Specifically,
Uc (c^ (fa, H)) € [aqO -H (1 - q) u, [c^ {b'^ {b, H) ,L)) .aO + [l - a) u^ (c^ {b"" {b, H) , L))] .
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available for a do^'viiturn do not outweigh the cost of leaving additional rents for a replace-
ment government in a boom. For the same reason, if the economy starts from 60 < b,
the government chooses c^ {bo, H) = u~^ (9), x^ {bo, H) — b — bo, and b'^ {bo, H) = b, in
order to starve the future government of resources. In summary, a prolonged boom in
this environment leads debt to b and to zero rent-seeking.
Figure 1: b'^ {b, H) vs. 6 for ct < a*
h"' [b, H)
Posituf Rents ' Z«o Rpni%
45';f4nt
These dynamics are different \i a > a* . Starting from 69 > 6, the government chooses
zero initial rents, and it gradually saves during the boom until debt eventually reaches
b. Once debt b drops below fe, the government chooses positive rents so that c^ {b, H) =
uj-* {9), x^ {b, H) = b — b, and b'^ {b, H) — b. Therefore, the government reaches a steady
state with positive rents, which is in contrast to the a < a* case. Thus, even if the
economy starts from zero rents, there is a possibility that rents may be positive in the
future if the boom persists for sufficiently long. The current politician does not want
to fully starve the future government of rents since he knows that it would expose the
economy to too much volatility, and he may as well postpone rent-seeking given that he
has a sufficiently high survival probability and is likely to consume these rents himself.
12
Figure 2: 6'^ (6, H) vs. 6 for a > o*
b"'{h.Hi
4Sltme
4.3 Comparison to Benevolent Government
In this section, we compare the path of debt and consumption under a rent-seeking gov-
ernment to that under a benevolent government. We begin by considering the impHcations
of the equihbrium if the boom is prolonged. Let {c^J'^q and [bf^-^ j^^^ correspond to the
equilibrium sequence of consumption and debt, respectively, conditional on a boom per-
sisting forever under a benevolent government starting from some initial debt bo. Define
{cf }r!.Q, and {6^i}j_„ analogously for a rent-seeking government.
Proposition 2 (long run)
hm 6f+i
lim cf
t—>oo
= — oo < lim b(+1 anc
oo > lim Ci = u^ (9)
t—^oo
Proposition 2 implies that a prolonged boom leads a rent-seeking government to hold
more debt than a benevolent government and to consume less (tax more) than a benev-
olent government. Though a rent-seeking government reduces its debt at the beginning
of the boom, it stops reducing its debt if the boom is sufficiently prolonged. This is be-
cause beyond a certain date, government resources become so abundant that rent-seeking
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considerations come to dominate intertemporal smoothing considerations. A rent-seeking
government realizes that if it were to save more, then a future replacement government
would use the additional funds for rent-seeking (which only benefits incumbent politicians)
as opposed to tax-cutting (which benefits households), and the government therefore re-
strains its savings in order to starve the future government of funds. Therefore, in the
long run, a prolonged boom always leads a benevolent government to hold more assets
and to tax less than a rent-seeking government. This result is consistent with that em-
phasized by Battaglini and Coate (2008). Our main contribution is to show that while
this characterization applies to the long run fairly generally, whether or not it applies to
the transitional dynamics of the economy depends on the level of economic volatility.
Next we consider the dynamics of public debt and taxes along the equilibrium path.
With some abuse of notation, let Uc (c^ (6, H; a)) represent the value of Uc (c^ {b, H)) for
a benevolent government facing uncertainty a. Define a and a as the unique solutions to
the following two equations:
f f e-a-u:'{6il-aq)/il-a)) ^ \\ , . ^
-
• ^"y \ fTTfl ,H;ajj=q9
b( ^- ^,,,,
,
„e-a-u-'{d{l-aq)l{l-a))
a : uAc"[e + a-u:'[e)^-P ^ ^
^ _ ^
^" '
'-^,H-a\\^qe
Lemma 4 (i) Q < cj* < a_ < a
,
(ii) a and a are decreasing m q and increasing in a,
(Hi) a and a approach as q approaches 1, (iv) Uc (^c^ [b, i/)) < qd iff a > a , and (v)
Uc{c'^{b,H))<qeiffa>a.
The lemma states that like a*, the cutoff points a and a decrease in political risk
q and increase in the persistence parameter a.^'* Moreover, like a*, these converge to
zero as q approaches 1, so that any positive value of a must necessarily exceed a as
q approaches 1. The parameter a is the level of volatility for which a > a implies
Uc (c^ (6, H) \a^ < qO. Uc [c^ {b, H) ; a^ decreases in ct since as economic volatihty a
increases, the steady state level of debt b decreases, and it decreases by an amount large
enough to cause the benevolent government's consumption at b to rise. Eventually, the
marginal utility of this consumption goes below q6. Analogous arguments hold for the
level of debt 6, where ct is the level of volatility such that o > a implies Uc (c^ (b, H^^ < q6.
The interpretation of these cutoff points for economies with a > a* is as follows:
If (J < £, then Uc[c^ {b, H)^ > qd for 6 G [6,6], which is the region in which debt
exceeds steady state debt and in which rent-seeking is positive. Therefore, the marginal
'Comparative statics with respect to d are ambiguous.
14
value of public funds for a benevolent government in the boom exceeds the (expected)
marginal value of public funds for a rent-seeking government in the boom who survives
with probability q and who values marginal rents with weight 9. In contrast, if cj > ct,
then Uc [c^ {b, H)) < qO for 6 G [6, 6] . In this case, the marginal value of public funds for
a benevolent government in the boom is below the (expected) marginal value of public
funds for a rent-seeking government in the boom.
As we will show, whether the marginal value of public funds for a benevolent gov-
ernment exceeds or is below qO in the rent-seeking region affects whether or not the
rent-seeking government saves less or more than a benevolent government. We show that
economies with a < g_ feature over-borrowing along the equilibrium path (Section 4.3.1),
and we show that economies with a > a feature over-saving along the equilibrium path
(Section 4.3.2). In the Appendix, we consider economies with a £ (ct, ct), and we show
that both over-borrowing or over-saving can occur along the equilibrium path, and this
depends on initial condition 6o- •
4.3.1 Low Economic Volatility
We begin by showing that the rent-seeking government over-borrows if economic volatility
is low.
Proposition 3 (starve the beast) If a < a, then h'^ {b, H) > b'^ (6, H) V6 and c^ {b, H) >
c^ {b,H) yb>b.
.
This proposition states that if economic volatility is low, then the rent-seeking govern-
ment always borrows more than the benevolent government, and it consumes more than
the benevolent government for levels of debt which exceed 6.'^ Therefore, the transition
path starting from bo >b features over-spending and over-borrowing, which is in line with
the conventional wisdom in the political economy literature.
The intuition for this result is that low economic volatility implies that politicians are
biased towards extracting rents today versus in the future, since political risk is high and
the cost of leaving the economy exposed in the downturn is low. This causes governments
to over-borrow and over-consume at later stages of the boom when debt is driven down
sufHciently and the prospect for rent-seeking approaches. Politicians at early stages of
the boom anticipate this behavior of politicians in the future, and for this reason, they
choose to over-borrow and to over-consume. The prospect of future rent-seeking therefore
reinforces over-borrowing and over-consumption in the present.
^^Whenever ff < £, there is some cutoff level of debt below which c'^ (b, H) < c^ (b, H). For the a < a*
case, this cutoff point is below b.
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More formally, imagine if volatility is so low that rents are never extracted under levels
of debt which exceed b (i.e., a < a*). Since x^ (6, //) = V6 > 6, then c^ (6, H) > c^ {b, H)
if and only if b'^ (6, H) > b'^ {b, H) from the dynamic budget constraint of the economy.
Since 6'-^ ib,H) > b'^ {b,H), the rent-seeking government must be choosing c^ {b,H) >
c^{b,H). Therefore, in steady state, the government over-borrows and over-consumes,
and the marginal cost of public funds at b under a benevolent government which equals
Uc [c^ {b, H)) exceeds the marginal cost of public funds under a rent-seeking government
which equals u^ (c^ (6, //)) = 9. This affects savings decisions for all levels of debt above
b. Consider the Euler conditions of the benevolent and rent-seeking government, (8) and
(14), respectively, for 6 € \b,'b\. Since b > b, c^ {b, L) — c^ (6, L) because debt is never
sufficiently low in the downturn to induce rent-seeking. Therefore, satisfaction of (8) and
(14) implies that b'^ {b, H) < b'^ {b,H) = b, since the benevolent government perceives
a higher marginal cost of public funds in the future than the rent-seeking government.
Thus, Uc (c^ (6, H)) < Uc [c^ {b, H)) so that the marginal cost of public funds is higher at
b under a benevolent government. Forward iteration of this argument implies that all rent-
seeking governments perceive a lower marginal cost of public funds in the future than the
benevolent government, and they consequently save less than the benevolent government.
An analogous argument holds if instead volatility is low, though rents are extracted
under levels of debt that exceed b and are below b (i.e., a* < a < a). In this case,
x^ (6, H) > for some b and it is no longer the case that c^ {b, H) > c^ {b, H) if and
only if b'^ (6, H) > b'^ {b, H). Nonetheless, note that the marginal cost of public funds in
the boom for the rent-seeking government for 6 G [6, b] equals qO since the government
expects to survive with probability q and to extract rents which provide marginal utility 6.
However, given the definition of a, Uc (c^ (6, i/)) > qO in this region so that the benevolent
government values public funds more on the margin than the rent-seeking government.
Therefore, analogous arguments to the previous case comparing (8) and (15) imply that for
6 > 6 for which b'^ {b, H)
€ [6, fe] , it is the case that b'^ {b, H) > b'^ {b, H) and c^ (6, H) >
c^ (6, H) (since x^ (6, H) — 0) so that the rent-seeking government over-borrows and over-
consumes. Since Uc [c^ {b, //)) < u^ (c^ (6, //)) , the rent-seeking government under-values
public funds at b and forward iteration on this argument implies that over-borrowing
occurs for all 6.
_
. ,
. ,-
, ,,
,
4.3.2 High Economic Volatility
The previous picture changes dramatically for high levels of economic volatility.
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Proposition 4 (feed the beast) If a > a, then b"^{b,H) < b'^{b,H) \/b > h and
c^ib,H) <c^{b,H) V6.
This proposition states that if economic volatihty is high, then the rent-seeking gov-
ernment saves more than tlie benevolent government for levels of debt which exceed 6,
and it consumes less (taxes more) than the benevolent government.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Whenever economic volatility is high, the
politician is less likely to consume rents today and more likely to consume them tomorrow
since this simultaneously protects the economy while providing him with potential rents
in the event of a boom during which he is not replaced. In anticipation of these rents
in the future, the rent-seeking government may actually over-save relative to a benev-
olent government since the marginal value of additional funds in the future boom due
to rent-seeking exceeds the marginal value of additional funds for a benevolent govern-
ment who would instead use the additional savings to increase consumption. This causes
governments to over-save and under-consume at later stages of the boom when debt is
driven down sufficiently and the prospect for rent-seeking approaches. Politicians at early
stages of the boom anticipate this behavior of politicians in the future, and for this reason,
they choose to over-save and to under-consume themselves. The prospect of future rent-
seeking therefore reinforces over-saving and under-consumption in the present. Future
governments are not cutting taxes during the boom in response to additional savings-the
natural response of a benevolent government-and this provides additional incentives for
savings today.
More formally, consider the government at values of debt 6 6 \b,b\. In this region,
the government chooses positive rents, and the marginal value of public funds for a rent-
seeking government who may be potentially replaced prior to entering the boom is q6.
Moreover, by the definition of ct, the benevolent government is so wealthy in this region
that its marginal value of public funds Uc (6, H) is below qO. The rent-seeking government
is extracting rents and also over-taxing in order to do so. Now consider values of 6 > 6 for
which b'^{b,H) e [b,b]. In this region, x^ [b,H) = so that c'"{b,H) < c^{b,H)
if and only if b'^{b,H) < b'^{b,H). Given (8) and (15), it must be the case that
b'^ (6, H) < b'^ (6, H) and c^ (6, H) < c^ (6, H) so that the rent-seeking government
over-saves and under-consumes. Since Uc[c^{b,H)) > u^ [c^ {b, H)), the rent-seeking
government over-values public funds at b and forward iteration on this argmnent imphes
that over-borrowing occurs for all b.
Note that even though the rent-seeking government over-saves along the equilibrium
path, in steady state it over-borrows relative to a benevolent government who instead
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drives its asset position to infinity.^'' In a sense then, it is the prospect of rent-seeking
and over-borrowing in the future which induces poHticians to over-save in the present.
This induces the rent-seeking government to over-tax both when it is anticipating future
rent-seeking and also in steady state when rent-seeking takes place.
5 Policy Implications and Discussion
A central implication of our model is that rent-extraction does not actually have to take
place for distortions to emerge. The main mechanism in our framework operates through
expectations. For example, when debt is sufficiently high, there are no rents independently
of the regime. However, there are important distortions in both the low and high volatility
scenarios.
In the low volatihty scenario there is a wedge pushing the government to tax and save
too little, since the government is worried that its potential replacement will squander
everything. That is, the current government is too expansionary and borrows too much.
In contrast, in the high volatility scenario, there is a wedge pushing the government to tax
and save too much. Here, fiscal policy is actually too contractionary, and society would
benefit from cutting taxes and saving less. In what follows, we illustrate these scenarios
and conclude by analyzing the impact of standard fiscal rules.
5.1 The Two Scenarios
Consider an economy with u{c) = log (c) and {P,e,a,a,6} = {.95, 100, 1.5, .95, .001},
where we have chosen 9 such that the long run level of debt in a boom in the a < a* case
is equal to 10. Consider two economies: q ~ .2 and q — .99, so that in one economy, the
current incumbent has an 80% chance of being replaced and in the other economy the
incumbent has virtually no chance of being replaced. Under this parameterization, the
low q case corresponds to an economy with cr <£, so that the government under-taxes
and over-borrows, and the high q case corresponds to an economy with a > a so that the
government over-taxes and over-saves.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the path of debt and consumption in the q — .2 economy
during a prolonged boom starting from a level of debt 6o — 30 for a rent-seeking and a
benevolent government. The rent-seeking government over-borrows relative to the benev-
olent government. This difference can be substantial. For example, at t = 40, the rent-
Formally, there exists a cutoff point in the range \b,h\ below which the rent-seeking government
over-borrows.
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seeking government holds a level of debt equal to 10 whereas the benevolent government
holds a level of debt equal to -33, a difference equal to over 40% of the endovi^ment of the
economy. The counterpart of the path of debt is not rent extraction (since a < a* < a)
but excessive consumption (low taxes) during the transition (Figure 4), and economic
fragihty during the downturn (not shown).
Figure 3: Path of Debt (cr < ct)
- Bene\«lenl Rent-Seeking
Figure 4: Path of Consumption {a < a)
- BenewDlent Rent-Seeking
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In contrast, Figures 5 and 6 consider the q = .99 economy during a prolonged boom also
starting from a level of debt 6o = 30. In this situation, the rent-seeking government over-
saves early on relative to the benevolent government (Figure 5). The difference between the
two governments can be substantial. For example, at i = 40 the rent-seeking government
holds level of debt equal to —46 whereas the benevolent government holds a level of debt
equal to —33, a difference equal to over 10% of the endowment of the economy. Ea,rly on,
the high taxes are used to reduce debt but later on they finance government rents. As a
result, consumption is lower than under the benevolent government throughout the boom
(Figure 6). Early on, when no rents are extracted, the economy gains in terms of extra
protection against the contraction. Later on, consumption is lower both during the boom
and the contraction.
Figure 5: Path of Debt [a > a)
- BenewDlent Rent-Seeking
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Figure 6: Path of Consumption [a > a)
5.2 Fiscal Rules
The conventional view, captured in Figures 3 and 4, has given support to the increasingly
popular policy option of adopting fiscal rules that essentially cap deficits (or require
surpluses) during booms (the budget, surplus or deficit rules). A natural question concerns
the degree to which such fiscal rules are useful in economies in which over-saving occurs
along the equilibrium path as in Figures 5 and 6. This question is particularly relevant
for commodity-economies which experience high economic volatility.
More specifically, consider an economy starting from b^ in which a benevolent govern-
ment would choose a sequence of consumption {cf\ in the boom. Imagine a fiscal rule
whereby the rent-seeking government in period t is allowed to choose any policy subject
to the constraint that such a policy must satisfy
Cj
-f X( < C(
,
;i6)
so that the government effectively cannot run a primary deficit above that of the benev-
olent government at any given date. The political environment is as described in Section
2.2 with the exception that (16) must be satisfied by every government in every period.
Since rents are zero under a benevolent government, (16) implies that the rent-seeking
government must save at least as much as the benevolent government at every date. The
next proposition characterizes the behavior of the economy under the fiscal rule where
[cf^ and (xf } correspond to the path of consumption and rents, respectively.
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during the boom under a rent-seeking government subject to the fiscal rule.
Proposition 5 (fiscal rules) cf + xf = cf at every t in the economy under the fiscal
rule and
Cf = min {cf, ^17^ (6')} and
ff = me.x{0,cf-u-'{e)}.
Proposition 5 states that the fiscal rule (16) binds, and c^ and 2f are chosen as in
Section 4 so that rents are only positive if the marginal value of consumption equals 6. The
rule binds in economies in which a < a since the unconstrained rent-seeking government
has higher equilibrium path deficits than the benevolent government. Thus the fiscal rule
reduces the government deficit along the equihbrium path and increases public saving.
More surprisingly, the rule binds in economies in which cr > ct so that the unconstrained
rent-seeking government has a lower equilibrium path deficit than the benevolent govern-
ment in the early phase of the boom. Therefore, even though the fiscal rule imposes a cap
on deficits, it actually induces the rent-seeking government to borrow more than it would
if it were unconstrained. The reason for this is that the rule works through expectations by
reducing the value of future public funds. More specifically, in this region unconstrained
governments over-save because they look forward to squandering public funds in the fu-
ture if the boom persists for suflficiently long. The fiscal rule however makes it impossible
to squander these public funds in the future since it forces a future government to save
more. Therefore, the rule reduces the value of future funds from today's perspective, and
this induces today's government to save less.
Note that the rule induces the government to consume more (tax less) and to extract
more rents than it would if it were unconstrained along the equilibrium path.'^ This is
because since the marginal value of funds in the future is lower, the current government
decides to use funds for itself today, and it does so in the form of higher consumption
and higher rent-seeking. This means that the government will begin to extract rents at
an earlier date than it would in the absence of rules, since rent-seeking begins at higher
levels of debt in comparison to an economy in the absence of rules.
Finally, note that while a fiscal deficit rule can force a rent-seeking government to save
in the same fashion as the benevolent government, it cannot control the composition of
public spending. Specifically, the government continues to squander resources on rents as
'^More specifically, the fiscal rules induce more consumption at high levels of debt and more rent-seeking
at intermediate levels of debt.
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opposed to cutting taxes if tlie boom is sufficiently prolonged or if initial resources are
very abundant. This suggests that a deficit rule must be combined with a cap on taxes,
so as to achieve the social optimum.
6 Final Remarks
We developed a dynamic political economy model of debt that characterizes public debt
and deficits along the transitional path and in the long run. This allowed us to re-examine
the conventional wisdom regarding the nature of political distortions. Our main result is
that in the short run phase of a boom-when the level of public debt is still high-it matters
whether the government faces high or low economic volatility. While the conventional
wisdom of under-saving holds in the latter case, it does not in the former. If economic
volatility is high, politicians over-save in the short run by keeping taxes too high.
In future work we intend to extend our analysis of fiscal policy in high economic
volatility environments. The natural next steps are to study the qualitative and welfare
properties of a broad class of fiscal rules found in practice,'*^ and to pursue empirical work
aimed at aligning these different rules with the characteristics of different countries and
regions.
.
''"^See for example Azzimonti, Battaglini, and Coate (2008) for an analysis of a balanced budget am-
mendment to the US constitution.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proofs
7.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Step 1. V^ {b, s) is strictly decreasing in b since a potential solution for 6 — e for e >
arbitrarily small lets c^ {b - e, H) = c^ (6, H) + e and b'^ (6 - e, H) = b'^ (6, H) which
satisfies all constraints and strictly raises welfare. It is strictly concave in b since the
objective function is strictly concave and the constraint set is convex. Differentiability
follows from the standard arguments of Benveniste and Sheinkman (1979).
Step 2. First order conditions and the envelope condition imply that Vj^^ {^-.H) —
—Uc[c^{b,H)^, which by step 1 implies that c^{b,H) is decreasing in b. These also
imply that V^^ {b, H) = aV^^ [b'^ {b,H),H) + {l- a) V^ (fe'^ (6, H) , L) so that b'^ [b, H)
is strictly increasing in b.
'"
'
'
' ''
Step 3. If b'^ {b, H) > b, then from step 2, u^ (c^ {b' {b, H))) > u, (c^ {b, H)), which
from (8) implies c^ [b' {b,L)) > c^ {{b,H)). However, given the budget constraint (3),
this contradicts 6'-^ (6,//) > 6. Q.E.D. ' •::
7.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Step 1. Given the characterization of policies in the text and the dynamic budget
constraint, we can write '
V^a.L) = -(min(.-a-Kl-/3).v'(f»)})^^^^ f^^.
-.-„: W_,1„,
I — p I l^P J
K^(6,L) = u {mm{e~a-b{l-/3),u:'{6)})
1-/3 -.
Step 2. All of the properties follow from this characterization. Q.E.D. ' '
7.1.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Step 1. In a r period economy, define
bt = {e + a - max {u-^ {9), 2a + u-^ (9(1 -aq)/ (I -a))}) I J2^j ^i^T and
kr+i = 0. . .
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Define 6( = e + a - il^^ (6) + /36,_^i
Step 2. Let the economy begin in tlie boom in period 0. If T = and 6^ > b-^, then
the pohcies of the benevolent government are chosen since those entail c^ [br, H) < -u^^ (6)
and x^ {br, H) = 0. If 67 < 67-, then first order conditions and the budget constraint yield
c^ {br, H) — u~^ (9) and x^ {br, H) > 0. Let V/ {bt, s) correspond to the value of V^ (•)
at date t in a finite period economy and let V/j, (bt, s) correspond to its derivativ^e with
respect to b. We can write
p f -uJcf (bt,H)) if 6, > 6,
VS{bt,H) = j\t ^t^ )) -t ^^^ ^^^^
if bt < b-,
10 d br < br
and all of the the properties follow from this characterization at T.
Step 3. If T = 1, consider V^^ {bt, H) for i = given step 2 and Lemma 2. Vj^ [bt,H) is
decreasing in bt since the constraint set is tighter and it is continuously differentiable in bt
by the arguments of Benveniste and Sheinkman (1979). If xf {bt, H) > 0, then necessarily
bf {bt,H) — ^(+1- To see why, first order conditions imply that if x^ {bt,H) > 0, then
cf{bt,H) - u-^ {9). Consider first if ct < ct* so that 6,+i = 6,+i. If b^'{bt,H) > b^^^,
then (14) cannot hold. If b^' {bt,H) < b^_^_^, then (15) cannot hold, where we have used
the fact that a < a*. If instead a > a*, then if fef' {bt,H) > 6(^j, neither (14) nor (15)
can hold and if 6f' {bt, H) < bt_^,^, then (15) cannot hold. This implies that xf {bt, H) >
only if bt < bt and xf {bt, H) = otherwise. This implies the properties of the lemma for
V";^ {bt,H) and Vt^ {bt,H) for bt < bf If bt > bt, then V,^ {bt,H) is strictly concave in bt
since xf (6^, H) = and the objective is strictly concave. Therefore, (17) holds at ^ = 0.
Moreover, since V,^ {bt, H) equals V,^ {bt, H) plus expected future rents, the arguments of
Benveniste and Sheinkman (1979) imply that V^^ {bt,H) = V,^ {bt,H) in this region.
Step 4. Successive application of Step 3 taking T to 00 yields the result. Q.E.D.
7.1.4 Proof of Proposition 1
Step 1. Define 6 as .
r _ f e
- u-^ {au, {9) + {I - a) u^ (uj' {9) + 2a)) + a + /3b H a < a*
~
\ e-u;^{9) + a + /3b ii a > a*
Step 2. The fact that b'^ {b, H) = b \f b < b and property (iii) for a > a" follows
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from step 3 of the proof of Lemma 3. The fact that h'^ {b, H) = b ii b < b and property
(ii) for a < a* follows from (14) and (15) together with the envelope condition that
V,''{b,H) = -u,{c{b,H)).
Step 3. Given (14), if b'^{b,H) > b, then necessarily Uc[c'" [b'^ [b,H) ,H)) >
Uc [c^ {b, H)) from the envelope condition since x^ (6, H) = ioi b > b. This then im-
plies c^ [b'^ (6, H) , L) > c^ (6, H), but this is a contradiction given the dynamic budget
constraints. Therefore, b'^ (6, H) < b if b > b.
Step 4. Substitute the envelope condition into (14) and (15) to achieve:
Vl''{b,H) = aVf {b"'{b,H),H) + {I- a) Vf{b"'ib,H),L) s^nd (19)
V,^ib,H) = ag\/,^(6'^(6,/f),//) + (l-a)\/,^(r(6,//),L), (20)
respectively. Since the right hand side of (19) and (20) are strictly decreasing in b'^ (6, H),
it must be that b'^ (6, H) is single valued, continuous, and is strictly increasing in b
whenever b'^ {b, H) ^ e + a - u.;^ {9) + 13b. If b'^ {b,H) = e + a - u-^ [9] + /36, then
V;^ (6'^ (6, H),H) e [-9, -q9] and V^^ {e + a - u;^ (9) + /36, L) is single-valued, which
implies that
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(e + a){l + l3) + u;' {aq9 + (1 - a) Vj" {e + a - u^' {9) + /36, L)) + Pu;' [9) + pb,
(e + C7) (1 + /3) + u-i {a9 + (1 - a) V^^ (e + a - u^' {9) + /36, L)) + Pu-' {9) + pb
so that 6'^ (6, H) is continuous in this region of b and is constant. Q.E.D. ; :,. -.
7.1.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Step 1. Proposition 1 implies that 6/^j G [6, &f ) if b^ > b. Since bf_^-^ is monotonic and
bounded it must converge. It cannot converge to any point other than b since 6'^ [b, H) < b
for b > b. If 6o < b, then Proposition 1 implies that 6,^j = b\ft. Finally, Proposition 1
implies that c^ (6, H) = u'^ {9).
Step 2. Lemma 1 implies that 6f^j G (— oo,6f). It cannot be that limt^oo^^i =
6^ > — oo since b''^ (6, H) < b for all 6. Given (3), this implies that lim(--,oo cf — oo.
7.1.6 Proof of Lemma 4
Step 1. We first show that a and a exist and are uniquely defined. Let c^ for j = H, L
correspond to the equilibrium value of consumption at date i as a function of the shock
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j for an economy beginning with debt bo and state Sq. We can manipulate (3) to write
bt-A 1 „ 1
,
Note that Cq = e — ct — 6o (1 — P), and more generally cf = e — ct — 6t (1 — /3). Substitution
into the above equation then yields a difference equation for consumption in the downturn
cf = -^cf_i--^(l-/?)cf_i + i2a(l-/3).
.
(21)
Therefore cf is increasing in cf_j and decreasing in cflj. Substitution of this equation
into the Euler equation yields
u'{c^)^
^
^^
^
^. (22)
Therefore c^ is increasing in c^_-^ and decreasing in cfij.
Step 2. The path of consumption follows (21) and (22) subject to Cq = e — a —
6o (1 ~ P) and Cq chosen to satisfy the present value budget constraint of the government
oo oo
J]/3'cf = J]/3'(e + a)-6o.
.
(23)
Define b and 6 as under the case for a > a* . Consider bo = b. An increase in a leaves
Cq unchanged and raises the right hand side of (23). If c^ weakly declines then forward
iteration on (21) and (22) implies that c^ decline for all (, violating (23). Therefore c^
strictly increases in a. If cr = 0, then Uc (c^) = 9 [l — aq) / {1 — a) > 9. If 6o = 6,
an increase in a reduces Cg. If Cq weakly declines then forward iteration on (21) and
(22) implies that cf weakly increases so that cf^ weakly decreases for all t, violating (23).
Therefore Cq strictly increases in a. If a = 0, then u^ (c^) > q9 under either bo — b or
bo = b. As a approaches oo, b and b approach — oo so that Cq approaches oo, and Uc (c^)
approaches < q9. Therefore, a and a exist and are uniquely defined.
Step 3. Properties (iv) and (v) follow from steps 1 and 2.
Step 4. An increase in q reduces b and b with no effect on Cq . This raises Cq by the
arguments of step 2, so that Uc (c^) decreases whereas q9 increases. An increase in a
raises b and b with no effect on Cq . This reduces Cq by the arguments of step 2, so that
Uc [cq) decreases whereas q9 is unchanged. This establishes property (ii).
Step 5. As q approaches 1, b approaches (e — ct — u~^ {9)) / (1 — /?) and b approaches
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2a + (e - a - u~^ {9)) / (1 - /?), establishing property (iii). For any a, Uc [cq) < 9, since
otherwise c^ > c^
,
yielding a contradiction.
Step 6. To establish property (i), imagine if cr > ct so that Uc [c^ (6,//)) < q9.
By Lemma 3, Uc [c^ ik,H)) < u^ [c^ (p^^)) ^ 9^) which from step 3 implies that a >
a. Therefore, a > a. Imagine if a = a*. Then b = {e + a - u~'^ (6*)) / (1 - /3) and
Uc (c^ {b, H))>e> qO since 6'^ (6, H) <bhy Lemma 3. Therefore, a* < a. Q.E.E).
7.1.7 Proof of Proposition 3
Step 1. Since b'^ {b,H) = b^b < b from Proposition 1, then from Lemma 1, b'^ {b,H) >
b'^ (6, H) yb<b.
Step 2. Imagine if a < a*. Then c^ (6, H) = u;^ {6) > c^ {b, H) since x^ (6, H) =
from Proposition L If 6 G [6,6], then from Proposition 1, b'^{b,H) = b, and since
x^ (fe, /f ) = 0, the Euler equation implies that
u,(c^(6,/f)) <an,(c^(6,i7)) + (l-Q)u, (c^(6,L)). (24)
Since c^ {b, L) = c^ (6, L) but c^ (6, if) > c^ (6, //), then in order that (8) hold given (24),
it must be that b'^ {b, H) < b'^ (6, H) and c^ (6, H) < c^ (6, H) in this region.
Step 3. If 6 6 b, b'^ (b, H) , then from Proposition 1 b'^ {b, H) e \b,b\, and from
step 2, c^ (6'^ (6, H),L) = c^ (6'^ (6, //) , L) but c^ (6'^ (6, /f ) , i^) > c^ (6'^ (6, if) , if).
Therefore, in order that (8) hold, it must be that b'^ (6, H) < b'^ [b, H) and c^ (6, H) <
c^ (6, H) in this region. Successive applications of this argument until the natural debt
limit implies that b'^ (6, H) < b'^ (6, H) and c^ (6, H) < c^ {b, H) Vfe > b. ': ' '
Step 4. Imagine if ct > a*. For any 6
€
b,b'^~' {b, H)\ b'^{b,H)
€ [6,6), and
(15) holds since x^ (6'^ (6, H) , H) > from Proposition 1. Since c^ (6'^ (6, H) , L) =
c^ [b'^ {b,H),L) but c^ (6'^ (6, ii) , if ) < g^, then in order that (8) hold given (15) it
must be that 6'^ (6, if) < 6'^ (6, if) and c-^ (6, if) < c^ (6, ii) in this region.
Step 5. If 6'^ (6, if) = 6, then since c^ (6'^ (6, if) , if) < c^ (6'^ (6, if ) , if ) , then
given (14) and (15), in order that (8) hold it must be that b'^ {b, H) < b'^ {b,H) and
c^ (6, H) < c^ (6, H) V6 > 6. .
Step 6. Successive applications of step 4 can be applied then to show that 6'^ (6, if) <
6'^ (6, if ) and c^ (6, if)< c^ (6, if ) V6 s.t. 6'^ (6, if)> 6. Q.E.D.
7.1.8 Proof of Proposition 4
Step 1. Given the definition of a, c^ (6, H) = u'^ {9) < u;^ {q9) < c^ (6, H) for 6 < 6.
28
step 2. For any b G 6,6'^"' {b,H)], b""{b,H) 6 [b,b), and (15) holds since
x^ (6'^ (6, //),//) > from Proposition 1. Since c^ [b"" {b, H),L) = c^ [b'^ (6, B) , L)
but c'^ [b'^ {b, H),H) > q9, then in order that (8) hold it must be that 6'^ {b, H) >
b'P {b, H) and c^ (6, H) > c^ {b, H) in this region.
Step 3. If b'P {b, H) = b, then since uf {b'^ [b, H) , H) < 9, then given (14) and (15),
in order that (8) hold it must be that b'^ {b, H) > b'^ {b,H) and c^ {b,H) > c^ {b,H)
V6 > 6.
Step 4. Successive apphcations of Step 2 then imply that b'^ {b, H) > b'^ {b, H) and
c^ (6, H) > c^ (b, H) V6 s.t. b'P {b, H) > b. Q.E.D.
7.1.9 Proof of Proposition 5
Step 1. Given (3), (16) implies that 6^j < 6^i along the equilibrium path, where 6^j
corresponds to the equilibrium level of debt under a politician constrained by the deficit
rule and 6f^j corresponds to the equilibrium level of debt under a benevolent government.
Step 2. Consider an economy in final period T in which 6^ < 6f . If (16) does not
bind, then this implies that 6^^^ < 6f_^j = 0, implying that the rent-seeking government
can strictly raise welfare by raising c^ or x^ and increasing t^+j. Therefore, (16) binds
at T. • • ,
Step 3. Consider an economy in period t < T in which (16) binds for all k > t if
b^ <
^f If (16) does not bind at t, then this imphes that 6^j < bf_^-^. Given that (16)
binds for all k > t, this implies that 6^_^j < bf^j — 0. This implies that the rent-seeking
government strictly raise welfare by raising cf or xf and increasing 6^j, leaving cf and
x^ unchanged for all k > t since this increases fe^+j. Therefore, (16) binds at t < T.
Step 4. By forward induction, (16) binds for all t and as T ^ oo. Q.E.D.
7.2 Intermediate Volatility: a G (o;,^)
In this section, we briefly describe the region of intermediate volatility which we do
not consider in the text. Given the definitions of a and a, there exists a cutoff point
be [b,b] s.t. uJc^(b,H)) = qB so that u,{c^{b,H)) < {>) q9 if 6 < {>)b. Con-
sider b e b.b'^'^^ (^) )• "^^^^ application of step 2 in the proof of Proposition 4 im-
plies that b'^ {b,H) > b"^ {b,H) and c^ (6,//) > c^ {b,H) in this region. Moreover, for
b G ib'^~^ (b) ,b'^~^ (b) j, then the application of step 4 in the proof of Proposition 3
implies that b'^ {b, H) < b'^ {b, H) and c^ (6, H) < c^ {b, H) in this region.
Now consider the region for which b'-^ ib,H) = b. Equation (15) holds with equality
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at a minimum value of b in this region, which means that b'^ (6, H) < b'^ (6, H) and
c^ {b,H) < c^ {b,H) at this point. Equation (14) holds with equality at the maximum
point in this region, which means that b'^ (6, H) > b'^ (6, H) and c^ (b, H) > c^ (6, H)
at this point. Since 6'^ (6, H) ^ b m this region and since b'^ {b, H) is monotonically
increasing, there exists a cutoff point b which splits the region such that if 6 < 6 and b is
in this region then b'^ (6, H) < b'^ (6, H) and c^ (6, H) < c^ {b, H), and if 6 > ^ and b is
in this region then b'^ {b, H) > b'^ (6, H) and c^ (6, H) > c^ (6, H).
Therefore, we can apply step 4 in the proof of Proposition 3 to the set of b's for which
b""{b,H) e (6,6) and and show that b'^ {b,H) < b'^ {b,H) and c^(b,H) < c^ {b,H).
Analogously, we can find a cutoff b such that we can apply step 2 in the proof of Proposition
4 to the set of 6's for which b'^ {b, H) , H e (b,bj and show that b'^ (6, H) > b'^ (6, H) and
c^ (6, H) > c^ (6, H). Forward iteration on this argument implies that there is a sequence
of regions between b and the natural debt limit in which there is either over-borrowing
and over-spending or over-saving and under-spending.
Thus, the path taken by the economy depends on the region in which 6o is located. If
6o is in the over-borrowing region, then over-borrowing occurs along the equilibrium path
until b is passed and if 6o is in the over-saving region, then over-saving occurs along the
equilibrium path until b is passed. , ,
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